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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Court of Appeals 
Case No.: 990132-CA 
Priority 7 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH and 
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
Labor Commission No.: 97-0608 
Respondents. : 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Petitioner Kristine S. Schreiber is from an Order 
Granting Motion for Review of the Labor Commission, State of Utah, dated January 27, 
1999. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 34A-2-801 (8) (a) and 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1998). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Labor Commission correctly applied the legal causation standard as 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986), in concluding that the impact of a rubber playground ball - which was 
1 
KRISTINE S. SCHREIBER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
found to be comparable to the jostling one frequently encounters in crowds— and the 
Petitioner's startled response — which was found to be similar to a momentary catch of 
one's balance ~ did not amount to unusual or extraordinary exertion. 
This Court's review is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA"), which provides relief if an agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (d) (1998). Pursuant to a 1994 legislative 
amendment, "[t]he [Labor] Commission has been granted broad discretion to determine 
the facts and apply the law. The Workers Compensation Act expressly provides that 'the 
commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the 
facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter it administers." Caporoz v. 
Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1997) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (l)1). 
"Where the Legislature's grant of discretion is as broad as that set forth in section 35-1-16 
(1), the intermediate standard of review . . . applies." Osman v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 
P.2d 240, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Under the intermediate standard of review, [the 
court] look[s] for an abuse of discretion . . . [to] determine whether the agency decision 
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." IdL (quotations omitted). Accord 
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
^his section has been recodified as 34A-1-301 (1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative provision is Utah Code Ann § 35-1-45 (1) (1988)2, which reads 
as follows: 
Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, and such 
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in 
case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
This section of the Workers' Compensation Act was interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), to require a 
claimant to prove medical and legal causation. Particularly, "where the claimant suffers 
from a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no 
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient." Id at 26 (emphasis 
added). 
2This section has been recodified as 34A-2-401 (1998). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
This case concerns a disputed workers' compensation claim. The Labor 
Commission has denied Ms. Schreiber's claim for workers' compensation benefits as a 
result of an alleged industrial accident which occurred on April 3, 1996, while she was 
employed by Respondent Jordan School District as a playground supervisor. 
Mrs. Schreiber has an undisputed pre-existing chronic low back condition which 
had been surgically treated with a titanium cage fusion at the L4-5 region. Mrs. 
Schreiber's claim for workers compensation benefits was denied by Respondent Jordan 
School District on the basis that her alleged industrial accident did not meet the higher 
standard of legal causation established by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), which requires a claimant with a pre-existing 
back condition to show that the injury resulted from unusual or extraordinary exertion 
during their employment. 
Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission of Utah on 
July 28, 1997. (R. at 2.) Respondent Jordan School District filed an Answer on August 
29, 1997, denying liability based upon the defenses of medical and legal causation. (R. at 
12.) A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Benjamin A. Sims on January 
12, 1998. (R. at 17.) Following the hearing, the case was referred by Judge Sims to a 
4 
medical panel appointed by the Labor Commission to evaluate the issue of medical 
causation. (R. at 71-75.) Following the receipt of the medical panel's report, Judge Sims 
entered an order on July 23, 1998, granting Mrs. Schreiber workers compensation 
benefits. (R. at 85-92.) 
Pursuant to an Order Granting Extension of Time, Respondent Jordan School 
District filed a timely Motion for Review of Judge Sim's Order with the Labor 
Commission on September 18, 1998. (R. at 97-102.) Mrs. Schreiber filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion on October 5, 1998. (R. at 104-111.) 
On January 27, 1999, the Labor Commission issued an Order Granting Motion for 
Review, finding that the particular facts of Mrs. Schreiber's alleged accident case did not 
constitute an unusual or extraordinary exertion. The Commission accordingly entered an 
order, setting aside Judge Sims' order and dismissing Mrs. Schreiber's claim for workers 
compensation benefits. (R. at 114-117.) 
Mrs. Schreiber filed a Petition for Review with this Court on February 11, 1999, a 
Docketing Statement on March 4, 1999, and a brief on May 19, 1999. The parties agreed 
to an extension to the filing of Respondent's brief, extending the deadline to Wednesday, 
July 21, 1999. 
5 
Statement of Facts 
Kristine Schreiber worked for Jordan School District at the Riverton Elementary 
School as a playground supervisor. (R. at 86, 114; 121, p. 13\) At recess on April 3, 
1996, a second grade student kicked an air filled rubber ball which accidentally struck 
Mrs. Schreiber in the small of her back.4 (R. at 114; 121, pp. 82, 97.) The young child 
was standing approximately 20-25 feet away from Mrs. Schreiber. (R. at 86.) Mrs. 
Schreiber was turned away from the child and had no warning that the ball was going to 
hit her. (R. at 86-87, 114.) Mrs. Schreiber claims that she suffered a back injury, 
requiring surgery, as a result of this incident. (R. at 2.) 
At the time of the accident, Mrs. Schreiber suffered from "a pre-existing chronic 
low back condition that had been surgically treated with a titanium cage fusion at the L4-
5 region" in 1992. (R. at 114.) Although she reported recovering well from this 
procedure, the medical records document continued pain which was classified as chronic 
prior to the April 3, 1996 incident. (R. at 86.) The parties submitted conflicting medical 
opinions concerning the medical cause of Mrs. Schreiber's need for additional back 
surgery subsequent to the April 3, 1996 incident. Based upon this dispute, the case was 
3The entire transcript of the hearing is marked in the Record as page "121." 
4While Mrs. Schreiber claims that the young eight year old intentionally kicked the 
ball into her back, there was no evidence that the incident was intentional. In fact, right 
after the ball hit Mrs. Schreiber, rather than run away Derrick came over to her. (R. at 
89.) He was nervous and laughed because he knew he would be in trouble. (R. at 89.) 
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referred to a medical panel for evaluation.5 
The Labor Commission made the following factual findings6 concerning the April 
3, 1996 incident: 
Given the speed and mass of the ball, its momentum was 
sufficient to cause Mrs. Schreiber's body to lurch forward, 
somewhat like being jostled in a crowd. 
In addition to the movement caused by the momentum of the 
ball, the unexpected nature of the impact produced a reflexive 
movement from Mrs. Schreiber, variously described as a 
"jump," "jerk," or "back and forward" movement. Mrs. 
Schreiber remained standing, despite the ball's impact and her 
startled response to the blow. 
(R. at 114-115.) 
The Labor Commission's factual findings were based upon the review of the 
testimony of several witnesses, including two expert witnesses who testified concerning 
the force of impact from the ball. Administrative Law Judge Sims concluded that the 
calculations provided by Paul France, Ph.D., the expert who testified on behalf of Jordan 
School District, "were probably closer to being correct." (R. at 88.) Dr. France, a 
biomechanical engineer met with Derrick Shields, the 8 year old second grader who 
kicked the ball. Dr. France measured the ball's velocity by taking measurements as 
5The Labor Commission's medical panel ultimately concluded that Mrs. Schreiber 
had satisfied her burden of medical causation. 
Petitioner has not challenged the factual findings of the Labor Commission. 
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Derrick kicked the ball a number of times. (R. at 121, pp. 108-110.) He also measured 
the compressibility of the ball and determined the area over which the force of impact of 
the ball would be spread. (R. at 121, pp. 111.) Finally, Dr. France reviewed Mrs. 
Schreiber's deposition and medical records and considered her weight in making his 
calculations. (R. at 121, pp. 111-117.) Based on this information, Dr. France deteimined 
the actual force exerted on Mrs. Schreiber from the air-filled rubber ball, concluding that 
it was minimal. (R. at 121, pp. 117-119.) Specifically, he found that it was an eighth to a 
quarter of the force developed when a person bends over to tie her shoe. (R. at 121, pp. 
117.) Dr. France explained that the force of the impact would be the equivalent of being 
jostled in a crowd. (R. at 121, pp. 118.) Notably, Dr. France testified that sitting down 
and back in a chair exerts 3 to 4 times more force than the ball that hit Mrs. Schreiber. 
(R. at 121, pp. 118.) 
Based upon this a review of the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, 
the Labor Commission found that "the direct force Mrs. Schreiber experienced from 
being hit by the ball was relatively minor, comparable to the jostling one frequently 
encounters in a crowd." (R. at 115.) The Labor Commission further considered Mrs. 
Schreiber's reaction to being hit by the ball, finding that "it appears that she stepped or 
lurched forward, then backward, without falling." (R. at 115.) The Commission found 
that this type of movement was comparable to a the ordinary event of a momentary loss 
of balance similar to "the everyday event of tripping on a rug or an uneven sidewalk." 
(R. at 115.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Labor Commission properly concluded that the alleged industrial incident did 
not meet the higher standard of legal causation which Mrs. Schreiber was required to 
meet based upon her pre-existing low back condition. This Court's review of the Labor 
Commission's Order is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. Unless this Court is 
able to conclude that the Labor Commission's conclusion was irrational and unreasonable, 
it must affirm the Labor Commission's Order. 
Pursuant to Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), employees 
such as Mrs. Schreiber who bring a pre-existing condition to the work site must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed industrial injury resulted 
from unusual or extraordinary exertion in the course of their employment. This standard 
is referred to as the higher standard of legal causation. Whether an exertion is usual or 
unusual is defined according to an objective standard, compared to the normal, everyday 
activities of men and women in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
In the present case, the Labor Commission found that the impact of the air-filled 
rubber playground ball, kicked accidentally into Mrs. Schreiber's back by the second grad 
student was a minor event, comparable to jostling in a crowd. The Labor Commission 
further found that Mrs. Schreiber's startled reaction was comparable to a momentary loss 
of balance, like tripping over a rug or an uneven sidewalk. The Labor Commission 
concluded, in considering each of these elements on an individual basis and combined 
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together, that the forces involved in the alleged accident were not extraordinary or 
unusual. The Labor Commission's conclusion is a reasonable and rationale application of 
the Allen standard to the particular facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
MRS. SCHREIBER'S ALLEGED INDUSTRIAL INCIDENT FAILED 
TO SATISFY THE HIGHER STANDARD OF LEGAL CAUSATION 
REQUIRED UNDER ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
A. The Proper Standard of Review of the Labor Commission's Order Is an 
Abuse of Discretion. 
Mrs. Schreiber has erroneously asserted that this Court's review of the Labor 
Commission's Order is governed by a correction of error standard. (Petitioner's Brief at 
1.) Whether an activity during employment is "sufficient to satisfy the legal standard of 
unusual or extraordinary effort so as to constitute a compensable industrial accident is a 
"mixed question of law and fact." Stouffer Foods v. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 
181 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 1994, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act, expressly granting the Industrial Commission7 broad discretion to 
"determine the facts and apply the law" governing workers' compensation. See Act of 
Industrial Commission Authority, Ch. 207, § 1, 1994 Utah Laws 972; codified at Utah 
7In 1997, the Industrial Commission was renamed the Labor Commission. 
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Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1994) (currently codified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1998), 
a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum). Mrs. Schreiber's alleged industrial 
accident occurred on April 3, 1996. 
This explicit grant of discretion changed the standard of review from a correction 
of error standard to an abuse of discretion standard. See Johnson Bros. Constr. v. Labor 
Common, 967 P.2d 1258 , 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Jacobsen v. Labor Common, 1999 
UT App 073, Case No. 981284-CA, fh. 1 (Unpublished Memorandum Decision, March 
11, 1999). (A copy of this opinion is attached hereto in the Addendum). Accordingly, 
for injuries arising after the 1994 Amendment, this Court is to review the Labor 
Commission's application of the Allen standard under an abuse of discretion standard, or 
in other words, "whether the agency decision exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Osman v. Industrial Comm'n. 958 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In adopting the higher standard of legal causation in Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that "the case law will eventually define a standard for typical 
'nonemployment activity' in much the way case law has developed the standard of care 
for the reasonable man in tort law." 729 P.2d at 26. Shortly thereafter, in Price River 
Coal v. Industrial Commission. 731 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court 
declared that "[t]he concept of 'unusual or extraordinary' exertion remains to be fleshed 
out over time. Of necessity, the process of pouring specific content into that concept will 
rely heavily upon the Commission's expertise in and familiarity with the work 
environment." 
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This Court has also recognized the Labor Commission's central role in defining the 
scope of activities which will be viewed as "unusual and extraordinary." See Smith & 
Edwards Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, 
both the Utah Legislature, through its statutory grant of authority, and the appellate 
courts, through case law, have repeatedly recognized that the Labor Commission serves 
an invaluable and central role in defining the scope of activities which will be considered 
"unusual and extraordinary" for purposes of applying the higher standard of legal 
causation under Allen. 
In Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission. 766 P.2d 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this 
Court rejected the adoption of a bright line test to determine what constitutes unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. Rather, this Court declared that what constitutes "unusual or 
extraordinary" exertion depends upon the unique facts and circumstances of the 
employment activity that is required. Id Consequently, significant deference and 
discretion are afforded to the Labor Commission in its application of the Allen 
standard to the particular set of facts in each case. See, e.g., Drake, 939 P.2d at 182 
(deference is afforded to Commission's decision on scope-of-employment issues because 
of its highly fact-dependent nature). 
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B. The Labor Commission Properly Concluded That The 
Alleged Industrial Incident Did Not Subject Mrs. 
Schreiber to Unusual or Extraordinary Exertion. 
The case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), is the 
seminal case concerning legal causation in workers compensation cases. In Allen, the 
claimant was working in a confined cooler located at his place of employment. The 
claimant was stacking crates from the floor onto a cooler shelf. Each crate contained four 
to six gallons of milk and weighed approximately fifty (50) pounds. While lifting one 
crate to about chest level, he suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower back. Subsequently, 
the claimant obtained a myelogram which revealed a herniated disc. Id. at 17. 
In Allen, the claimant testified he had a history of prior back injuries. The sole 
issue on appeal was whether the claimant, who had suffered pre-existing back problems 
and was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his job, was injured "by 
accident arising out of or in the course of employment" as required by the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Id at 18. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (1998). 
In order to arise out of and in the course of employment, a causal connection 
between the injury and employment must exist. The standard of proof for establishing a 
causal connection is "by a preponderance of the evidence." Allen. 729 P.2d at 23. The 
court explained, 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a 
pre-existing condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he 
13 
already faced in every day life because of his condition. 
This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually 
supplied by an exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life, and serves to offset the pre-existing 
condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a 
personal risk factor rather than exertions at work. 
Id. at 25 (emphasis added). In other words, "where the claimant suffers from a pre-
existing condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion 
is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no pre-existing condition, a usual or 
ordinary exertion is sufficient." Id at 26 (emphasis added). 
Whether an exertion is usual or unusual is defined according to an objective 
standard. The comparison does not involve an employee's normal employment exertion 
and the exertion at the time of injury; rather, the Commission must compare the exertion 
at the time of injury with the exertion required in normal activities non-employment life 
of men and women in the latter half of the 20th century. LI Typical activities cited in 
Allen as requiring normal exertion of men and women in the latter part of the 20th 
century include "taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for 
travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and 
climbing the stairs in buildings." Id The Utah Supreme Court explained that in adopting 
an "objective standard, the case law would (eventually) define a standard for typical, 
'non-employment activity' in much the way case law has developed a standard of care for 
the reasonable man in tort law." Id. at 25. 
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Following Allen, the appellate courts and the Labor Commission have reviewed 
numerous cases which reflect a breadth of activities found to involve usual or ordinary 
exertion for men and women in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. One of the 
activities which have not met the higher standard of legal causation include lifting, 
turning, and moving boxes weighing 47-1/2 lbs., Smith & Edwards v. Industrial 
Commission. 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and yet Mrs. Schreiber would have 
this Court find that the minor impact of being hit by a rubber playground ball kicked by a 
second grade student, coupled with a startled reaction, would be found to meet the higher 
standard of legal causation. Indeed, Respondent submits that it would come as a great 
surprise to the parents of thousands of grade school age children who play with balls 
during recess at school or who participate in youth soccer that their children are in danger 
because of the unusual and extraordinary nature of their play. 
Mrs. Schreiber alleges that the Labor Commission erred in its conclusion, posing 
the rhetorical question to the court, "how often or [when was] last time that [you were] 
unexpectedly hit by a soccer ball traveling in excess of 35 mph in every day life." 
(Petitioner's Brief at 12.) The incident, described in this subjective manner, does appear 
at first glance to be unusual or extraordinary. However, when the incident was 
objectively evaluated by the biomechanical expert, the actual impact and force involved 
in this incident was far from the cruise missile depicted by Mrs. Schreiber. Instead, the 
actual exertion or force of the air-filled rubber ball which hit Mrs. Schreiber was minor. 
The Labor Commission found that it was comparable to being jostled in a crowd. This 
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finding has not been challenged by Mrs. Schreiber and is supported by substantial 
evidence in the Record. Consequently, in this Court's review of the matter is limited to 
whether Labor Commission's conclusion is reasonable and rational. 
In addition to the impact of the rubber ball, Mrs. Schreiber has alleged that her 
surprised reaction to being hit made the incident unusual or extraordinary. Specifically, 
Mrs. Schreiber has compared her startled reaction to the facts of the case of American 
Roofing v. Industrial Commission, 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In American 
Roofing, the employee leaned over the bed of a truck to lift up a 30-pound bucket of 
debris. The bucket snagged, and the employee injured his back. The court affirmed the 
Labor Commission, finding that evidence of the weight, together with the manner in 
which the employee lifted the bucket, and the fact that the bucket snagged, all combined 
to characterize the employee's action as unusual or extraordinary under the Allen 
definition. 
The facts of the present case cannot reasonably be compared to the facts in 
American Roofing. Mrs. Schreiber was not lifting anything at the time of the incident. 
She was not in an awkward position. She was not bent over or straining to perform a task 
in any way. Rather, she merely had a startled response to being hit in the back by an air-
filled rubber playground ball kicked by an eight year old child. The impact from this ball 
was found to negligible and her startled reaction to being hit was found to be comparable 
to a momentary catch of one's balance, like tripping on a rug or an uneven sidewalk. 
There was no actual fall, but a slight "jerk," "jump," or "back and forward" movement. 
16 
A more reasonable comparison is made with the case of Bigler v. TW Services, 
Inc., Case No. 950838-Ca (Memorandum Decision August 8, 1996); Labor Commission 
Case No. 94-0273 (Industrial Commission Sept. 29, 1995). In Bigler, the claimant was a 
cafeteria cashier. She was standing at the register when a copy of the daily menu began 
to fall from the counter to the floor. Ms. Bigler lunged and twisted to catch the falling 
menu. The Labor Commission reversed the ALJ's award of benefits, concluding that Ms. 
Bigler's movement in trying to catch the falling menu was not unusual, but similar to 
ordinary events of daily life such as reaching to catch a tipped glass of milk, swatting 
flies, or grabbing for the safety of a small child. This Court affirmed the Labor 
Commission's Order, finding that "[a] one-time lunge and twist to catch a falling object is 
not uncommon of activities in everyday life and does not involve unusual exertion." (A 
copy of this Court's Memorandum Decision and the Labor Commission's decision are 
attached in the Addendum.) 
In the present case, the Labor Commission properly and thoroughly reviewed the 
facts and circumstances surrounding Mrs. Schreiber's alleged industrial accident. 
Specifically, the Labor Commission received testimony from numerous witnesses, 
including two expert witnesses who provided scientific calculations of the forces involved 
in the alleged incident. This objective analysis allowed the Commission to appropriately 
compare the exertion and/or forces involved in the alleged incident with the exertion or 
forces involved in ordinary events of non-employment life, rather than simply rely upon 
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the subjective description of the incident provided by Mrs. Schreiber. The Labor 
Commission properly exercised its discretion in concluding as follows: 
[T]he direct force Mrs. Schreiber experienced from being hit 
by the ball was relatively minor, comparable to the jostling 
one frequently encounters in crowds. As to Mrs. Schreiber's 
surprised reaction to being hit by the ball, it appears that she 
stepped or lurched forward, then backward, without falling. 
This type of movement does not appear to be different from 
the everyday event of tripping on a rug or an uneven 
sidewalk. 
(R. at 115.) 
Having concluded that Mrs. Schreiber failed to meet her burden of legal causation, 
the Labor Commission properly dismissed her claim for workers compensation benefits. 
This Court should affirm the Commission's dismissal as a reasonable and rationale 
application of the Allen standard to the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts as found by the Labor Commission have not been challenged by Mrs. 
Schreiber. Rather, she challenges the Labor Commission's application of the legal 
causation standard established in Allen v. Industrial Commission to the particular facts of 
this case. Because of the fact-sensitive nature applying the Allen standard, the Utah 
Legislature and the appellate courts have recognized that the Labor Commission's integral 
role in evaluating whether an activity involved unusual or extraordinary exertion. 
18 
In the present case, the Labor Commission properly evaluated the unique facts of Mrs. 
Schreiber's alleged industrial accident. The Labor Commission reviewed and evaluated 
the testimony supplied by numerous witnesses, including two expert witnesses who 
supplied a scientific evaluation of the forces involved in the accident. The Labor 
Commission properly concluded that based upon the objective analysis of Mrs. 
Schreiber's alleged accident, the impact of the air-filled rubber ball was minor and Mrs. 
Schreiber's startled response was not unusual. This Court should affirm the Labor 
Commission's Order dismissing Mrs. Schreiber's claim. 
Respectfully submitted this of July, 1999. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
<0ft n&fclJM/-—-
Thomas C. Sturdy 
Don K. Petersen 
Attorneys for Jordan School District 
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363 UTAH LABOR CODE 34A-1-303 
PART 3 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
34A-1-301. Commiss ion jurisdict ion and power. 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdic-
tion, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in 
this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers. 1997 
34A-1 -302. Pres id ing officers for adj udicat ive proceed-
ings — Subpoenas — Independent judgment 
— Consol idat ion — Record — Notice of order. 
(1) (a) The commissioner shall authorize the Division of 
Adjudication to call, assign a presiding officer, and con-
duct hearings and adjudicative proceedings when an 
application for a proceeding is filed with the Division of 
Adjudication under this title. 
(b) The director of the Division of Adjudication or the 
director's designee may issue subpoenas. Failure to re-
spond to a properly issued subpoena may result in a 
contempt citation and offenders may be punished as 
provided in Section 78-32-15. 
(c) Witnesses subpoenaed under this section are al-
lowed fees as provided by law for witnesses in the district 
court of the state. The witness fees shall be paid by the 
state unless the witness is subpoenaed at the instance of 
a party other than the commission. 
(d) A presiding officer assigned under this section may 
not participate in any case in which the presiding officer is 
an interested party. Each decision of, a presiding officer 
shall represent the presiding officer's independent judg-
ment. 
(2) If, in the judgment of the presiding officer having 
jurisdiction of the proceeding the consolidation would not be 
prejudicial to any party, when the same or substantially 
similar evidence is relevant and material to the matters in 
issue in more than one proceeding, the presiding officer may: 
(a) fix the same time and place for considering each 
matter; 
(b) jointly conduct hearings; 
(c) make a single record of the proceedings; and 
(d) consider evidence introduced with respect to one 
proceeding as introduced in the others. 
(3) (a) The commission shall keep a full and complete 
record of all adjudicative proceedings in connection with a 
disputed matter. 
(b) All testimony at any hearing shall be recorded but 
need not be transcribed. If a party requests transcription, 
the transcription shall be provided at the party's expense. 
(c) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the 
Division of Adjudication. The records shall include an 
appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the 
appeals. 
(4) A party in interest shall be given notice of the entry of a 
presiding officer's order or any order or award of the commis-
sion. The mailing of the copy of the order or award to the 
last-known address in the files of the commission of a party in 
interest and to the attorneys or agents of record in the case, if 
any, is considered to be notice of the order. 
(5) In any formal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding 
officer may take any action permitted under Section 63-46b-8. 
1997 
34A-1-303. Rev iew of administrat ive decis ion. 
(1) A decision entered by an administrative law judge under 
this title is the final order of the commission unless a further 
appeal is initiated under this title and in accordance with the 
rules of the commission governing the review. 
(2) (a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who is entitled 
to appeal a decision of an administrative law judge under 
this title, may appeal the decision by filing a motion for 
review with the Division of Adjudication. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests in 
accordance with Subsection (3) that the appeal be heard 
by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the 
review in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Admin-
istrative Procedures Act. A decision of the commissioner is 
a final order of the commission unless set aside by the 
court of appeals. 
(c) (i) If in accordance with Subsection (3) a party in 
interest to the appeal requests that the appeal be 
heard by the Appeals Board, the Appeals Board shall 
hear the review in accordance with: 
(A) Section 34A-1-205; and 
(B) Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. 
(ii) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order 
of the commission unless set aside by the court of 
appeals. 
(3) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard 
by the Appeals Board by filing the request with the Division of 
Adjudication: 
(a) as part of the motion for review; or 
(b) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a 
motion for review, within 20 days of the date the motion 
for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
(4) (a) On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board 
may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law 
judge; 
(ii) modify the decision of an administrative law 
judge; 
(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge 
for further action as directed; or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision 
of an administrative law judge. 
(b) The commissioner or Appeals Board may not con-
duct a trial de novo of the case. 
(c) The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its 
decision on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; 
or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental 
evidence requested by the commissioner or Appeals 
Board. 
(d) The commissioner or Appeals Board may permit the 
parties to: 
(i) file briefs or other papers; or 
(ii) conduct oral argument. 
(e) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly 
notify the parties to any proceedings before it of its 
decision, including its findings and conclusions. 
(5) (a) A member of the Appeals Board may not participate 
in any case in which the member is an interested party. 
Each decision of a member of the Appeals Board shall 
represent the member's independent judgment. 
(b) If a member of the Appeals Board may not partici-
pate in a case because the member is an interested party, 
the two members of the Appeals Board that may hear the 
case shall assign an individual to participate as a member 
of the board in that case if the individual: 
(i) is not a interested party in the case; and 
(ii) was not previously assigned to preside over any 
proceeding or take any administrative action related 
to the case. 
(6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the 
party appealing the order has exhausted all administrative 
appeals, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to: 
A-i 
FILED 
MAR t 1 1999 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS _ 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
J e s s i c a D. Jacobsen, 
Pe t i t i one r , 
v . 
Labor Commission, Salt Lake 




(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981284-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 1 , 1999) 
| 1999 UT App 073 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: M. David Eckersley, Salt Lake City for Petitioner 
Stuart L. Poelman and Dori K. Petersen, Salt Lake 
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Pacific Reliance Insurance 
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Labor 
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Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Jackson. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
This case is before this court for a second time. See 
Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n. 897 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). Jessica D. Jacobsen petitions this court for review of 
the Utah Labor Commission's (Commission) ruling that her 
employment activity was not an unusual or extraordinary exertion, 
and its resulting order reversing the administrative law judge's 
award of workers' compensation benefits. We affirm. 
Whether an employment activity is "sufficient to satisfy the 
legal standard of unusual or extraordinary effort so as to 
constitute a compensable industrial accident" is a "mixed 
question of law and fact." Stouffer Foods Corp. v. industrial 
Commf n. 801 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because the 
statute governing compensation for work-related injuries "'does 
not expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the [Labor] 
Commission in construing the specific language of the statute,' 
[w] e . . . review for correctness the [Commission's] application 
of the statute to these facts."1 Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 
P. 2d 56, 58-59 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Cross v. Board of 
Review. 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); accord Drake 
v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); £££ Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-40KD (1997); and see Smallwood v. Board of 
Review, 841 P.2d 716, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating this 
court reviews a legal causation ruling by "review[ing] the 
agency's record to determine whether the agency erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law so as to substantially prejudice" 
the injured employee) . Because the issue of whether an 
employment activity amounts to an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion is highly fact-sensitive, we " f convey [] a measure of 
discretion to [the Commission] when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts. I,f Drake, 939 P.2d at 182 (quoting State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). 
Here, the Commission ruled that petitioner's exertion at 
work which precipitated her injury was not an unusual or 
extraordinary exertion meeting the legal causation prong of the 
test established in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 
1986). Petitioner's claim for workers' compensation benefits was 
therefore denied. While petitioner does not necessarily disagree 
with the Commission's ruling, she argues that because her 
"injurious exertion is subject to fair debate as to whether it 
was unusual or extraordinary, the Commission must, consistent 
with the previously enunciated law of this State, resolve that 
issue in favor of the injured worker." We disagree. "' [W] here 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it 
is for the Board to draw the inferences.1'1 V-l Oil Co. v. 
Division of Envtl. Response and Remediation, 962 P.2d 93, 94 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Additionally, our 
supreme court recognized that "[t]he concept of 'unusual or 
1. In 1994, the Legislature granted the Commission broad 
discretion to "determine the facts and apply the law" governing 
workers' compensation. See Act of Industrial Commission 
Authority, ch. 207, § 1, 1994 Utah Laws 972; codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1994) (currently codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-1-301 (1997)). This explicit grant of discretion created a 
different standard of review. See Johnson Bros. Constr. v. Labor 
Comm' n. 967 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, 
because petitioner's case arose before the effective date of this 
statutory change, we do not apply the current standard of review. 
See Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671, 
675 (Utah 1997) (" [I]n workers' compensation claims, the law 
existing at the time of the injury applies in relation to that 
injury."). 
981284-CA 2 
extraordinary' exertion [must be] fleshed out over time. Of 
necessity, the process of pouring specific content into that 
concept will rely heavily upon the Commission's expertise in and 
familiarity with the work environment." Price River Coal Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah 1986). If this 
court were to compel the Commission to hold in favor of the 
employee each time there is a "fair debate" whether an exertion 
is unusual or extraordinary, we would defeat the Commission's 
delegated role in the administrative review process. 
Because we agree with the Commission that petitioner's 
exertion of lifting the tray is similar to "the kinds of 
activities that are commonly experienced in modern nonindustrial 
life," we hold that the Commission correctly interpreted and 
applied the Allen test of legal causation. See Smallwood. 841 
P.2d at 720. We therefore affirm the Commission's order denying 
petitjjarr&s. workers ' compensation benefits. 
WE CONCUR: 
£&**&&> Sm 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
A s s o c i a t e P r e s i d i n g Judge 
Noo£nan H.. Jacksqj£~ Judge 
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PER CURIAM: 
It is undisputed that Bigler suffers from preexisting back 
problems. Thus, she must prove legal causation--"that the 
employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk 
[she] already faced in everyday life because of [her] condition." 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). In 
other words, she must prove that the workplace incident involved 
"an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday 
life." Id-. 
Having reviewed and considered the record, we conclude that 
the Commission properly denied benefits. A one-time lunge and^ 
twist to catch a falling object is not uncommon of activities in 
everyday life and does not involve unusual exertion. Thus, the 
legal causation prong of Allen is not met. Having reached this 
conclusion, we need not consider the medical causation prong. 
Accordingly, the Commission's order is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Uudith M. Billings, Judge 
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